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Outbreaks of emerging zoonotic infectious diseases, such as Ebola virus, highly pathogenic 
avian influenza (H7N9) and Middle East respiratory syndrome, have occurred in recent 
years, causing infections of these relatively rare diseases among international travellers. An 
additional emerging zoonosis is monkeypox,1 which was first identified in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1970 but since 2010 has expanded to cause outbreaks among 
humans in seven additional African countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and South Sudan.1,2 Starting in 
September 2017, a large, ongoing human monkeypox outbreak in Nigeria has caused 269 
suspect and 115 confirmed cases from 25 states and 1 territory, including large cities.2
In September and October 2018, three international travellers (two from the UK and one 
from Israel) became infected with monkeypox after exposure in Nigeria.2,3 Additionally, one 
healthcare worker who did not travel but had documented contact with one of the ill 
international travellers in the UK was infected.4
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The two UK travellers were not known to be epidemiologically linked to one another: one 
was a Nigerian naval officer who travelled to the UK for training and the other a UK resident 
returning from holiday in Nigeria. Each reported a rash that started in the groin before 
leaving Nigeria; one traveller reported contact with an ill individual at a family gathering 
and wild animal meat (bushmeat) consumption. Both travellers were initially treated for 
other conditions, a staphylococcal infection in one traveller and a fever in the other; both 
received antibiotics but experienced spread of their rash and worsening symptoms.3
The third traveller, from Israel, was reported in October 2018 to GeoSentinel 
(www.istm.org/geosentinel), a global clinician-based sentinel surveillance system that 
monitors travel-related illness and other conditions among international travellers. The 
Israeli traveller sought medical attention 1 week after returning to Israel from Nigeria. He 
was likely infected with monkeypox in Port Harcourt, Nigeria, after exposure to two dead 
rodents in his home; no other animal exposures were reported.
The three travellers and one UK healthcare worker represent the first reported cases of 
human monkeypox detected outside Africa since 2003, when a monkeypox outbreak 
occurred in the USA after direct contact with ill prairie dogs which had been exposed to 
rodents imported from Ghana.5 These cases also represent the first-time international 
travellers have been implicated in the spread of monkeypox outside of an outbreak setting. 
Monkeypox incidence has increased over the past 10 years, and waning smallpox vaccine 
immunity, which provides cross-protection against monkeypox virus as well as a large 
younger unimmunized susceptible population, may be contributing to this increase.6 Civil 
unrest in West and Central Africa may be bringing humans and animals into closer 
proximity through population movement, environmental disruption and the need to eat 
wildlife.1 International travellers may be at risk of acquiring monkeypox during travel to 
endemic countries or locations with outbreaks, especially if participating in activities that 
involve close personal contact with ill humans or animals. Immunocompromised travellers 
may be at high risk of severe complications from monkeypox, including death; four of the 
seven deaths reported from the Nigeria outbreak had preexisting immunocompromising 
conditions.2 Pregnant women with monkeypox may have poor birth outcomes, including in 
utero virus transmission resulting in fetal death.7
As the spread of monkeypox to a healthcare worker in the UK exemplifies, ensuring 
appropriate clinical suspicion of monkeypox is critical for case recognition and control of 
virus spread. Low clinical suspicion for monkeypox, resulting in delayed personal protective 
equipment (PPE) use, may have resulted in nosocomial monkeypox transmission to the 
healthcare worker.3 Documented monkeypox transmission has occurred within healthcare 
facilities in the DRC8; and elsewhere in Africa, there may be poor infrastructure and limited 
resources to effectively identify, diagnose and treat suspect cases. In addition, lack of clinical 
suspicion, inadequate isolation facilities and lack of PPE may play roles in the delay of 
appropriate isolation measures. Illness clustering is common; sequential person-to-person 
transmission has been documented to occur between up to six individuals.8 Smallpox 
vaccination provides cross-protection against monkeypox; the vaccines8 are not 
commercially available but were used for pre- and post-exposure prophylaxis among 
healthcare workers in close contact with the UK cases.3 In addition to smallpox vaccine, 
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cidofovir, ST-246 and vaccinia immune globulin can be used for monkeypox outbreak 
control.9
Clinical suspicion for travel-related diseases can be improved if healthcare providers 
integrate a travel history into screening and triage of all patients to prevent the spread of 
emerging infectious diseases in community and healthcare settings. A detailed travel history 
should include the trip itinerary, including destination(s) and travel dates, activities while 
abroad and potential exposures (including animals and ill persons with rashes). Collecting 
the travel dates and relating this information to the incubation period for suspected diseases 
is important when forming a differential diagnosis; the typical monkeypox incubation period 
is 7–17 days8 but may vary by transmission route. It is difficult to distinguish monkeypox 
and smallpox skin lesions, but lymphadenopathy is typically a prominent feature of 
monkeypox.8,10 Healthcare providers must also maintain situational awareness of current 
outbreaks related to specific international destinations from the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) at https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/notices. Healthcare providers must 
remain vigilant about not only detecting cases but also minimizing transmission through 
preventive measures and optimizing access to appropriate clinical management. If a travel-
related illness is suspected, consulting an infectious disease specialist is advised.
Travellers also play a role in preventing a potential infection with monkeypox while abroad. 
Monkeypox transmission occurs through direct contact (e.g. skin lesion exudates, faeces) 
with ill animals or humans, inhalation of respiratory excretions from ill humans or exposure 
to bushmeat.8 Although the disease name suggests that monkeys are the primary host, the 
monkeypox reservoir host is unknown, but rodents are suspected10; monkeys, like humans, 
are accidental hosts. CDC recommends that travellers to Nigeria and other countries with 
monkeypox can help prevent a potential monkeypox infection by washing their hands often 
with soap and water; not touching eyes, nose or mouth; avoiding close contact with people 
who are sick; avoiding contact with wild animals or wild animal products and meat that 
could harbour the virus (including animals that are sick or have been found dead in areas 
where monkeypox occurs); and avoiding contact with materials, such as bedding, that have 
been in contact with a sick person or animal.11 Immunocompromised travellers, including 
pregnant women, should avoid travel to areas experiencing a monkeypox outbreak.
Public health and clinical organizations must continue to emphasize the risk of emerging 
zoonoses. Continuing robust clinical surveillance of international travellers through 
networks such as GeoSentinel is important to alert the medical community of sentinel events 
of emerging zoonotic infectious diseases and prevent their spread.
The monkeypox outbreak in Nigeria, with subsequent spread to international travellers and 
healthcare workers treating ill persons, should serve as a reminder to remain vigilant about 
emerging zoonoses, such as monkeypox. Healthcare providers should counsel travellers, 
especially those at high risk, about monkeypox and how to avoid it; maintain clinical 
suspicion for monkeypox; practice prevention measures; and stay current with emerging 
zoonoses epidemiology.
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